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Absolutism—the view that there is sense to be made of discourse concerning “absolutely
everything”—plays an important role in contemporary philosophy. It is a natural backdrop
for ontological claims (e.g. “there are no abstract objects”); it is used to ensure that rival meta-
physical views pertain to a single subject-matter (Williamson 2013); it is the key assumption
in standard arguments for the expressive richness of plural quantifiers (Boolos 1984, McKay
2006, Oliver & Smiley 2013); and it plays an important role in certain research programs in
the philosophy of mathematics (McGee 1997) and the semantic paradoxes (Field 2008).
Although absolutism is not without its detractors, it seems to be an increasingly promi-
nent view amongst contemporary metaphysicians.1 The prevailing attitude is nicely summed
up by Timothy Williamson: “The most serious concern about [unrestricted uses of quan-
tifiers] is their close association with the paradoxes of set theory . . . However, one cannot
generate [the relevant] contradiction just by using unrestricted quantifiers. The contradic-
tion always depends on auxiliary assumptions . . . [and we] can reject those assumptions
without rejecting unrestricted quantification.” (Williamson 2013, p 15)
I would like to suggest that this passage underplays the case against absolutism.2 It seems
to me that the most compelling anti-absolutist considerations come not from the set theo-
retic paradoxes but from a particular conception of relationship between our language and
1For a recent overview, and a list of references, see Florio 2014.
2For relevant discussion, see Russell forthcoming.
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the world it represents. The aim of this paper is to give a precise characterization of this con-
ception, and to explain how it can be used to buttress a non-absolutist picture of ontology.
I begin with some preliminary remarks about realism and ontology (sections 1 and 2).
I then develop a domain-free semantics for first-order quantifiers (section 3), and use it to
develop a “facts first” conception of the world, according to which there is no such thing as
an “absolutely general” domain of discourse (sections 4 and 5).
1 Realism
To a first approximation,3 realism is the view that there is a definite fact of the matter about
how that world is: a fact of the matter that is independent of our conception of the world,
our values, and our representational resources.
I am a realist. I believe, for example, that there is a definite fact of the matter about
whether Venus has moons. But my realism has its limits. Take Harry, who is a borderline
case of baldness. I do not believe that there is a definite fact of the matter about whether he
is bald. This is not because I think that reality is somehow incomplete, or that it is somehow
mind- or value-depedent. It is because I think the sentence “Harry is bald” does not succeed
in expressing a condition definite enough to make it possible for reality to settle the question
of whether the condition has been met.
Here is another example. I believe there is no such thing as “metaphysical fashionabil-
ity”: fashionability in a sense that transcends the tastes of some community or other. So I do
not believe that there is a definite fact of the matter about whether ascots are metaphysically
fashionable. As before, this is because I think the sentence “ascots are metaphysically fash-
ionable” does not succeed in expressing a condition definite enough for reality to settle the
question of whether the condition is met. In this case, however, the reason has nothing to
3There are problems with this first approximation. For instance, the fact that we have such-and-such repre-
sentational resources is, in a trivial sense, dependent on our representational resources. But we don’t thereby
want to count as anti-realists about what representational resources we have. Nothing in the present discussion
will hinge on how one chooses to finesse such issues. For further discussion see Rosen 1994.
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do with vagueness. It is instead to do with a false presupposition. “Ascots are metaphysically
fashionable” presupposes a well-defined distinction between the metaphysically fashionable
and the not. Since there no sense to be made of such a distinction, there is no way for reality
to settle the question of which side of the distinction ascots belong on.4 To put the point
in set-theoretic terms: it is not that the set of metaphysically fashionable things is empty,
and therefore fails to include ascots; it is rather that “metaphysically fashionable” does not
succeed in characterizing a set at all.
Realism is a metaphysical view: it is a doctrine about the nature of reality. But, as our
examples show, it is sometimes hard to separate the extent of one’s realism from one’s views
about language, and, in particular, about which sentences succeed in specifying conditions
definite enough to be settled by reality.
2 Ontology
What about ontological realism—realism about what there is?
It is clear that some ontological questions have definite answers. For example, an as-
sertion of “there are seventeen eggs in the basket” (uttered in a situation in which nothing
unusual is going on) can be expected to succeed in specifying a condition definite enough to
be settled by the way the world is. And similarly for an assertion of “there are seventeen
objects in the basket”, in the presence of suitable contextual cues.
I would like to suggest, however, that there are ontological questions that lack definite
answers. To illustrate the point, consider the metaphysical picture I shall call objectualism.
Objectualists believe that reality is “objectively structured”: it is articulated into constituents
in a way that is significant independently of the manner in which we happen to represent
it. They believe, moreover, that the objective constituents of reality can be classified in
accordance with their “ontological character”: some of them enjoy “saturated” ontological
4Compare addendum (a) to Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.
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character, and are what we call objects; others have “unsaturated” ontological character,
and are what we call properties. As a result, an objectualist’s conception of objecthood is
informed by her metaphysics: she thinks that to be an object is to be an objective constituent
of reality with saturated ontological character. (On a more sophisticated version of the
proposal, she thinks that the relevant constituent of reality are “fundamental objects”, which
“ground” further non-fundamental objects.5)
Suppose a group of objectualists is having a discussion about the objective constituents
of reality, and that one of them asserts “the objects are inaccessibly many in number”.6 It is
not clear to me that there is a fact of the matter about whether this assertion is true. The
worry is not to do with whether reality is somehow incomplete, or whether it is somehow
mind- or value-dependent. It is to do with whether the assertion succeeds in specifying a
condition definite enough to make it possible for reality to settle the question of whether
the condition is met. Let me explain.
I earlier claimed that there is no fact of the matter about whether ascots are metaphys-
ically fashionable, on the grounds that an assertion of “ascots are metaphysically fashion-
able” suffers from a false presupposition: it assumes, incorrectly, that there is a well-defined
distinction between the metaphysically fashionable and the not. Now suppose one is skep-
tical of the objectualist’s metaphysical picture: one thinks there is no sense to be made of
a “saturated ontological character”, and therefore no sense to be made of the objectualist’s
conception of object. Then one should think that the objectualist’s assertion of “the objects
are inaccessibly many in number” also suffers from a false presupposition: it assumes, incor-
rectly, that there is a well-defined distinction between the ontologically saturated and the not
ontologically saturated. Such a presupposition failure would thwart one’s effort to specify
a condition definite enough to make it possible for reality to settle the question of whether
the condition is met.
5See Fine 2001, Schaffer 2009, Sider 2012, Bennett forthcoming.
6The notion of inaccessibility I have in mind here is a plural version of the set-theoretic notion of a
(strongly) inaccessible cardinal. For details, see Shapiro 1991.
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In arguing that the objectualist’s assertion fails to have a definite answer, I made use of
the assumption that objectualists work with a metaphysically informed conception of object.
Suppose we instead considered ontological questions that are posed using a “neutral” notion
of object: a notion of object free from theoretical commitments. Would there then be a fact
of the matter about whether the objects are inaccessibly many in number?
It is not clear to me that there is such a thing as a “neutral” notion of object. I certainly
agree that words like “object”, “item” and “thing”, and associated quantificational resources,
are part of natural language, and I agree that one can be a competent user of such expressions
without associating them with anything like the objectualist’s metaphysical picture. Notice,
however, that ordinary use of quantification tends to presuppose highly restricted domains
of discourse. (When I utter “there is something missing from my suitcase” in an ordinary
context, it is understood that I am not concerned with the Milky Way, or Socrates’s death,
or my bank account, or the direction of the Earth’s axis, or the concept of justice, or the
number 17.) In contrast, when a metaphysician considers the question of whether the objects
are inaccessibly many in number, she purports to be asking a much more general question: a
question that concerns “absolutely everything”. And it is not obvious that absolutely general
claims of this kind occur in non-philosophical contexts. As a result, it is not obvious that
mere linguistic competence gives us the resources to pose ontological questions of the sort
that are our present concern.
One way to argue that mere linguistic competence affords us the resources to pose such
questions is to assume a certain picture of quantification, a picture whereby ordinary (non-
absolutely general) quantification is the result of adding a restriction to an absolutely general
quantifier. Accordingly, all that is required to engage in absolutely general quantification
is to find a way of keeping out the restriction. Since the restriction is often determined
by context, this is partly a matter of positioning oneself in the right kind of context. And
ontological investigation provides a context of just the right kind.
A key aim of this paper is to show that that there is an alternate picture of quantifica-
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tion, one that does not see ordinary (non-absolutely-general) quantification as the result of
restricting an absolutely general quantifier.
3 A domain-free account of quantification
The proposal I would like to consider is based on a very simple idea. It treats existential
quantification as as a generalized form of disjunction, and universal quantification as a gen-
eralized form of conjunction. (I will restrict my attention to first-order languages.)
Let me spell out the idea in a little further detail.7 It is natural to think of the logical op-
erators “¬” and “∨” as expressing propositional operations: operations that take propositions
as input and yield a proposition as output. The operations in question can be characterized
algebraically. One starts with a space of propositions. No assumptions are made about the
internal structure of individual propositions (they are treated like “black boxes”), but one
assumes that the space of propositions forms a complete Boolean Algebra.8 This means,
in particular, that every proposition has an algebraic complement, and that every set of
propositions has a least upper bound.9 (The easiest way to visualize this is to think of propo-
sitions as sets of “worlds”, and take the algebraic complementation and least upper bound
operations to correspond to the set-theoretic complementation and union operations, re-
spectively.) One then takes the logical operator “¬” to express algebraic complementation,
and the logical operator “∨” to express the least upper bound operation of the algebra.
On the proposal I would like to consider, “∃” expresses the least upper bound operation
of the algebra, just like “∨”. But whereas “∨” only takes two propositions as input, “∃” takes
arbitrarily many. Because the least upper bound operation is a purely algebraic operation,
7For different proposals which are similar in spirit, see Fraassen 1982, Dorr 2014 and Turner typescript.
8Importantly, we do not presuppose that the algebra is equipped with cylindrification operations, since this
additional structure would mirror that of a domain. For more on cylindric algebras, see Henkin et al. (1971).
9Both of these operations can be defined on the basis of a reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive entailment
relation on propositions. The least upper bound of a set of propositions is the strongest (i.e. most entailing)
proposition entailed by each proposition in the set. The complement of a proposition p is the strongest
proposition p such that the least upper bound of p and p is entailed by every proposition.
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it is characterized with no appeal to a domain of discourse. So everything we have done so
far is consistent with our aim of specifying the meaning of the existential quantifier without
appealing to domains of discourse.
Unfortunately, our work is not yet complete. We have given a precise specification
of the operation expressed by the existential quantifier, but we have yet to give a precise
specification of the range of propositions that the operation is to take as input when it
comes to evaluating particular instances of existential quantification. Let me explain.
Suppose, first, that we wish to determine which proposition is expressed by the disjunc-
tive sentence p(A ∨B)q. Since “∨” expresses the least upper bound operation, the proposi-
tion we’re looking for is the result of applying the least upper bound operation to certain
input propositions. Which input propositions? Answer: the proposition expressed by A and
the proposition expressed by B.
Now suppose we wish to determine which proposition is expressed by the existentially
quantified sentence p∃x(P (x))q. Since the existential quantifier expresses the least upper
bound operation, the proposition we’re looking for is the result of applying the least upper
bound operation to certain input propositions. Which input propositions? Here the answer
is less straightforward.
The standard approach is to bring in a domain of discourse, and characterize the input
propositions as the propositions that say of some object in the domain that it has the prop-
erty expressed by P . But this answer is unavailable in the present context, so we will have
to do things differently.
A domain-free semantics
Let us start with the question of how to interpret the atomic sentences of a first-order lan-
guage. On a standard domain-based semantics, one starts by assigning an object from one’s
domain to each individual constant, and an n-place property of such objects to each n-place
predicate letter. One then maps the atomic sentence pP (a1, . . . , an)q to a proposition that
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ascribes the property that is assigned to P to the objects that are assigned to a1, . . . , an.
On the picture I would like to develop here, the initial assignment of sub-propositional
entities is just a middleman: it is a means for assigning propositions to sentences, which is
what we are really after. The way to cut out the middleman it to think of the meanings
of predicates and names as constraints on the propositions that one is allowed to express
using atomic sentences, and to specify these constraints without invoking an assignment of
sub-propositional entities to predicates and individual constants.
I spell out the details in the appendix, but the basic idea is straightforward. One starts
with the notion of an atomic assignment: a function that assigns a proposition to each atomic
sentence of the language in a way that respects the logical properties of “=”. One then
characterizes one’s understanding of the predicates of the language by singling out a set
I of atomic assignments. (Intuitively the atomic assignments in I are those one takes to
respect one’s understanding of the predicates of the language.) Next, one characterizes one’s
understanding of the individual constants of the language by selecting an assignment ι ∈ I .
(Intuitively, ι is taken to respect both one’s understanding of the predicates of the language
and one’s understanding of the individual constants.)
Each member i of I is an assignment of propositions to atomic sentences. But by
taking“¬”, “∨” and “∃” to express suitable algebraic operations, one can easily expand i
to a function J. . .Ki which assigns a proposition to each sentence of the language:
• if A is an atomic sentence, then JAKi = i(A);
• Jp¬AqKi is the algebraic complement of JAKi;
• JpA ∨BqKi is the least upper bound of JAKi and JBKi;
• Jp∃x φ(x)qKi is the least upper bound of the set of propositions Jpc = cqKj∩Jpφ(c)qKj ,
where j ∈ I agrees with i on atomic sentences not involving c.
The intended interpretation of the language is the special case of J. . .Ki in which i = ι.
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Sentential truth is characterized on the basis of propositional truth in the usual way: a
sentence A is true if and only if JAKι is a true proposition.
The Representation Theorems
Our domain-free semantics can be used to prove the following results. (See appendix for
details.)
Representation Theorem Any assignment of propositions to sentences that can be gener-
ated using a domain-free semantics can also be generated using a domain-based seman-
tics (given a suitable domain of objects).
Converse Representation Theorem Any assignment of propositions to sentences that can
be generated using a domain-based semantics (given a suitable domain of objects) can
also be generated using a domain-free semantics (without having to presuppose a do-
main).
I’ll have more to say about these results below. But let me start by mentioning an analogy
that I think helps bring out the significance of the Representation Theorem.
There is a familiar way of using objects and properties to characterize possible worlds,
and using possible worlds to characterize propositions. Roughly speaking: one specifies
a possible world by selecting a domain of objects (thereby specifying the objects that are
to exist at the world) and selecting an assignment of properties to those objects (thereby
specifying the properties are to be enjoyed by the objects in our domain at the world).
Proposition can then be characterized as sets of possible worlds.
Could one go in the opposite direction? Could one start with an algebra of propositions,
and use it to characterize a space of possible worlds, together with an assignment of objects
and properties to each world? As Stalnaker (1976) points out, going from an algebra of
propositions to a space of worlds is relatively straightforward: one can think of a world as a
9
maximally consistent proposition.10
The next step is to specify a domain of objects, and a suitable assignment of properties
to objects, for each of the resulting worlds. This might turn out to be a relatively straightfor-
ward task if one starts with a space of structured propositions. Suppose, for example, that one
works with Russellian propositions: one thinks of “basic” propositions as property/object
pairs (or, more generally, as n-place relation/n-tuple pairs), and of non-basic propositions as
Boolean combinations of basic propositions. One might then take the domain of a world to
consist of any objects that figure in basic propositions that are entailed by that world, and
use those basic propositions to characterize an assignment of properties to objects.
In the present context, however, we are not allowed to help ourselves to Russellian propo-
sitions. All we are allowed to assume about our space of propositions is that it enjoys a cer-
tain amount of algebraic structure: the propositions themselves are treated like black boxes.
What the Representation Theorem shows is that one can get around this limitation by using
a first-order language to “carve up” worlds into objects and properties in a principled way.
A little more precisely: suppose one starts with an algebra of propositions, and uses it to
interpret a first-order language by defining an interpretation function J. . .Kι which assigns a
proposition in the algebra to each sentence, subject to the constraints described above; the
theorem shows that there is a systematic way of using J. . .Kι to characterize a space of possi-
ble worlds and specify a suitable domain of objects and assignment of properties for each of
the resulting worlds.11
10In algebraic terms, this means that a possible world is an atom of one’s algebra: an element p of the algebra
which is such that p does not entail ⊥ on its own but does entail it in conjunction with any element of the
algebra that is not already entailed by p. What if one’s algebra is non-atomic? It is a consequence of Stone’s
Representation Theorem that any Boolean Algebra can be embedded in an atomic Boolean Algebra in which
every proposition is a set of atoms. So one can think of the original algebra as an (incomplete) collection of
sets of worlds of the embedding algebra.
11The expressive resources of a first-order language are fairly limited. One manifestation of these expressive
limitations is the Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem, which entails that a countable first-order theory with infinite
models has models of every infinite cardinality. So although one can use a first-order language to state that
there are infinitely many objects, one cannot go on to specify the size of that infinity. This has an important
consequence in the present context. It means that if one uses a first-order language to “carve up” worlds
into objects and properties in the way I’m suggesting, the language may be compatible with many different
carvings, not all of which are isomorphic to one another. On the Facts First View, which I develop below,
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Taking stock
I earlier noted that one might be tempted to endorse a picture of quantification according
to which ordinary English quantifiers presuppose an “absolutely general” domain: a domain
consisting of “absolutely everything”. If this picture is correct, it is not clear how one could
be a realist about whether, e.g. there are seventeen eggs in the basket without also being a
realist about questions concerning the “absolutely general” domain that ordinary quantifiers
presuppose. Our domain-free semantics offers an alternative to this picture by showing that
one can specify the behavior of a first-order quantifier without presupposing a domain of
discourse. The Representation Theorems add precision to that response by showing that the
assignments of propositions to sentences that can be generated by a domain-based semantics
(given a suitable domain) are exactly the assignments that can be generated by a domain-free
semantics (without having to presuppose a domain).
4 Objects First vs. Facts First
The Representation Theorems also supply the formal groundwork for a “facts first” concep-
tion of the relationship between our language and the world it represents. The aim of this
section is to explain what such a conception amounts to. I start with a pair of impressionistic
slogans:
Objects First The world consists of the totality of objects, and their properties.
What about facts? A basic fact is the result of ascribing a property to one or more
objects; a fact is a Boolean combination of basic facts.
Facts First The world consists of the totality of facts.
What about objects? All it takes for a singular term to refer is for it to occur in an
atomic sentence that expresses a true proposition.
there is nothing to privilege one of these carvings over the rest. Since ontology is language-relative, there is no
sense to be made of ontological questions that transcend the expressive resources of our language.
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How might these slogans be made more precise? One might be tempted to do so by bringing
in a notion of fundamentality: on the Objects First View, objects are “more fundamental”
than facts; on the Facts First View, facts are “more fundamental” than objects. But that
is not how I will understand them here, because I’m not sure about the consequences that
fundamentalist readings of the slogans would have for the portions of our theorizing that
do not invoke talk of fundamentality, or related notions. I will instead spell out each of
the slogans as a pair of claims about the relationship between our language and the world
it represents. The first member of each pair is a claim about reference; the second member
is a claim about what it takes for an assignment of propositions to sentences to count as
admissible.
What is admissibility? Start by considering the distinction between language use and
abuse. Consider, for example, the English sentence “The Times has decided to change its for-
mat” (Nunberg 1978). This sentence can be used to communicate that a publisher decided
to change the format of its publication. One might take the view that any attempt to use the
sentence to express such a content, without the intervention of some sort of pragmatic repair
strategy, would constitute an instance of language abuse, since it would require using “the
Times” to refer to two different entities. Another example: consider the question of whether
the first-order sentence “2+2=4” can be used to express truth-conditions that impose no
substantive ontological demands on the world. One might take the view that it cannot, on
the grounds that an atomic first-order sentence can only be true if its singular terms refer,
and that the reference of singular terms always imposes a non-trivial ontological demand on
the world. This is not my own view. But if it is correct, then any attempt to use “2+2=4” to
express ontologically innocent truth-conditions without pragmatic intervention would con-
stitute an instance of language abuse. An admissible assignment of propositions to sentences
is one that allows for language use, rather than abuse. It is an assignment that respects the
relationship that ought to obtain between a properly functioning language and the world it
represents.
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In explicating Objects First and Facts First I will make an important simplifying assump-
tion. I will restrict my attention to first-order languages, and presuppose a negative free
logic.12 I will also take the notion of objecthood under discussion to be captured by the
first-order existential quantifier.
The Objects First View
The Objects First View presupposes that there is a domain of objects whose significance is
independent of the way in which we happen to represent the world. I shall take it to be the
“absolutely general” domain. This domain is then used to set forth the following two theses:
Reference Thesis (Objects First Version)
For a singular term to refer is for it to be paired with an object from the abso-
lutely general domain.
Admissibility Thesis (Objects First Version)
An assignment of propositions to sentences is only admissible if it is generable
by: (a) choosing a subdomain of the absolutely general domain as the range of
one’s quantifiers, (b) assigning an object from this subdomain as a referent for
each individual constant, (c) assigning and an n-place property to each n-place
predicate, and (d) assigning propositions to sentences compositionally, in the
usual way.
The Facts First View
The Facts First View constitutes a rejection of the Objects First View. It is based on the
somewhat inchoate idea that our conception of objecthood is essentially tied to the language
we use to represent the world, and has been discussed in different forms by a many dif-
ferent philosophers, including Gottlob Frege, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, Robert
12A free logic is a classical logic that allows for empty individual constants. A negative free logic is a free
logic in which an atomic sentence can only be true if its individual constants are non-empty. This means, in
particular, that pa = aq is logically equivalent to p∃x(x = a)q, for a a constant.
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Stalnaker, Gideon Rosen and John Burgess.13 In the next few paragraphs I will try to add
some precision to the picture, by drawing on the domain-free semantics of section 3.
On the version of the Facts First View I will develop here, there is an analogy between
objecthood and fashionability: just like there is no sense to be made of the question of
what counts as fashionable in a sense of fashionability that transcends the tastes of some
community or other, so there is no sense to be made of the question of what counts as an
object in a sense of objecthood that transcends a particular language.
It is no part of the view, however, that “∃” has a hidden contextual parameter. The ex-
istential quantifier is modeled using a domain-free semantics according to which it expresses
the least upper bound operation of one’s algebra of propositions—a parameter-free operation
which is fully determined by the structure of the algebra. Where then does the language-
relativity of our conception of objecthood come from? The key observation is that even if
different first-order languages agree about treating the existential quantifier as a least upper
bound operator, they might disagree about the range of propositions that the least upper
bound operation should take as input when it comes to assessing a particular existential
sentence.
The upshot is that even though “∃” is interpreted uniformly across different first order-
languages, “∃x(x = x)” doesn’t always express the same proposition. What does the differ-
ence turn on? On a domain-free semantics, the proposition expressed by “∃x(x = x)” is
determined by one’s understanding of the predicates of the language. More specifically, it is
defined as the least upper bound of the propositions Jpc = cqKj , where j is an interpretation
of the language which respects one’s understanding of the predicates of the language, but
may or may not respect one’s understanding of c. Recall, moreover, that on a domain-free
semantics one’s understanding of the predicates of the language is specified with no recourse
to a domain of discourse. One does so by setting forth a constraint on assignments of propo-
13Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik; Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language; Wright, Frege’s Conception
of Numbers as Objects; Stalnaker, “What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”; Rosen, “The Refutation of Nominal-
ism (?)”; Glanzberg, “Quantification and Realism”; and Burgess “Being Explained Away”.
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sitions to atomic sentences. And the constraint is identified by selecting a set I of functions
form atomic sentences to propositions.
Are there any restrictions on one’s choice of I? A proponent of the Objects First View,
would recommend an absolutist restriction. Recall that her Admissibility Thesis entails
that an assignment of propositions to sentences is only admissible if it can be generated by
selecting a subdomain of the absolutely general domain, and using it to assign referents to
one’s singular terms. So she thinks that the only admissible choices of I are those that would
lead to an interpretation of the language that can be generated in that way.
A proponent of the Facts First View disagrees. She rejects the Objects First version of
the Admissibility Thesis in favor of the following:
Admissibility Thesis (Facts First Version)
An assignment of propositions to first-order sentences is admissible just in case
it is generable by a domain-free semantics.
Accordingly, she thinks that the admissibility of an assignment of propositions to sentences
does not depend on whether the assignment could have been generated by starting with a
subdomain of the “absolutely general” domain and using it to fix a referent to each individual
constant of the language.
The Representation Theorems help clarify the connection between the two versions
of the Admissibility Thesis. They entail that an assignment of propositions to first-order
sentences is generable by a function J. . .Ki if and only if it could have also been generated by
a domain-based semantics, given a suitable domain. This means that the Facts First View and
the Objects First View agree about an key issue: an assignment of propositions to sentences
is only admissible if it is generable by a domain-based semantics, given a suitable domain.
Where they come apart is on the question of whether admissibility also requires that the
relevant domain exist as part of the world’s “absolutely general” domain.
A second component of the Facts First View is needed to complete the picture: a con-
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ception of reference. As I noted above, a friend of the Facts First View thinks that there
is no sense to be made of the notion of objecthood independently of a particular language.
Similarly, she thinks that there is no sense to be made of the notion of reference indepen-
dently of a particular language. Within a particular language, however, one can elucidate the
notion of reference by asserting a version of the following:
Reference Thesis (Facts First Version)
For a singular term of the language I am now speaking to refer is for it to figure
in an atomic sentence of my language, and for that sentence to expresses a true
proposition.
In the case of a first-order language, the Reference Thesis might seem trivial. For suppose
some singular term a is taken to refer by speakers of the language. Then they will take
pa = aq to express a true proposition, and so think that a figures an atomic sentence that ex-
presses a true proposition. Conversely, suppose that a figures in an atomic sentence pP (a)q,
which expresses a true proposition. When one assumes a negative free logic, as we are doing
here, pP (a)q entails p∃x(x = a)q. So speakers of the language must take a to refer.
Taken in conjunction with the Admissibility Thesis, however, the Reference Thesis be-
comes much more interesting. The best way to see this is to consider an example. Let LN be
the language of first-order arithmetic,14 and let ι be the following atomic assignment for LN:
• ι(A) = >, if A figures in one of these lists:
 “0 = 0”, “1 = 1”, “2 = 2”, . . .
 “+(0, 0, 0)”, “+(0, 1, 1)”, “+(1, 0, 1)”,“+(1, 1, 2)”, “+(0, 2, 2)”, . . .
 “×(0, 0, 0)”, “×(0, 1, 0)”, “×(1, 0, 0)”,“×(1, 1, 1)”, “×(0, 2, 0)”, . . .
• ι(A) = ⊥, otherwise.
14In addition to the identity symbol “=”, L consists of the three-place predicates “+” and “×”, corresponding
to addition and multiplication, and the individual constants “0”, “1”, “2”, etc.
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where> and⊥ are the top and bottom elements of our algebra of propositions, respectively.
On natural assumptions,15 this delivers the result that JφKι = > if φ is an arithmetical truth,
and JφKι = ⊥ otherwise.
It follows immediately from the Facts First version of the Admissibility Thesis that J. . .Kι
is an admissible interpretation of LN. So there is an admissible interpretation of LN on which
every standard arithmetical truth counts as necessarily true, and every standard arithmetical
falsehood counts as necessarily false. This means, in particular, that each of the atomic
sentences “0 = 0”, “1 = 1”, . . . expresses a necessarily true proposition. Now suppose
we are speaking a language that extends LN. A version of the Reference Thesis for our
language entails that the numerals “0”, “1”, . . . are all genuinely referential, and therefore the
conclusion that natural numbers exist.16 And, crucially, we have arrived at this conclusion
without ever considering the question of whether the “absolutely general” domain includes
numbers amongst its constituents.
The point generalizes. According to the Facts First View, when propositions have been
assigned to the sentences of a first-order language in a suitably systematic way, the fact that
an atomic sentence has been assigned a proposition that turns out to be true is enough
to guarantee that the sentence’s singular terms are genuinely referential, and therefore that
the feature of the world that verifies the truth of the proposition is accurately described as
containing objects.
The Facts First View vindicates a version of the Fregean idea that a given content might
be “carved up” into constituents in more than one way. Suppose, for example, that we wish
to talk about whether Susan and Bob are happy and wise, and set up a first-order language
to do so. We want our language to be distinctive in a certain respect, however. We want
15Specifically: we let I be the set of atomic assignments that agree with ι except perhaps for a relabelling of
the individual constants.
16Here I assume that our metalanguage contains singular terms corresponding to the numerals of LN. The
assumption is certainly satisfied in the present context, since English has its own numerals. But it is worth
noting that it would be satisfied even if English didn’t contain its own numerals because we could also use,
e.g. “the referent of ‘0’ ”.
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the proposition that is actually expressed in English using “Susan is happy” to be expressed
by the first-order “Susanishly(happiness)” (read “Happiness is susanishly instantiated”), and
similarly for other cases. We proceed by letting LP be a first-order language containing
the individual constants “happiness” and “wisdom”, and the predicates “Susanishly” and
“Bobishly”. We then let ι be the following atomic assignment for LP :
• ι(“Susanishly(happiness)”) = J“Susan is happy”KEn
• ι(“Bobishly(happiness)”) = J“Bob is happy”KEn
• ι(“Susanishly(wisdom)”) = J“Susan is wise”KEn
• ι(“Bobishly(wisdom)”) = J“Bob is wise”KEn
where JAKEn is the element of our algebra of propositions that is expressed by the English
sentence A.
As before, it follows from the Facts First version of the Admissibility Thesis that J. . .Kι
is an admissible interpretation of LP .17 So we know that there is an admissible way of
using the atomic sentence “susanishly(happiness)” to express the proposition that Susan is
happy. Now suppose we are speaking a language that extends LP . On the assumption
that Susan is indeed happy, a version of the Reference Thesis for our language entails that
“happiness” is genuinely referential. This gives us a precise sense in which one might say that
the proposition that Susan is happy can be “carved up” into constituents in different ways.
When we describe it using “Susan is happy”, we take it to have Susan as a constituent and
we take it to say, of her, that she is happy; when we describe it using “susanishly(happiness)”
we take it to have the property of happiness as a constituent, and we take it to say, of it, that
it is susanishly instantiated.
17To the assignments above, we add ι(“happiness = happiness”) = ι(“wisdom = wisdom”) =>. For technical
reasons, we must assume that LP contains infinitely many individual constants. So we add the constants “a1”,
“a2”, . . . , and treat them as empty names. I is the set of atomic assignments that agree with ι except perhaps
for a relabelling of the individual constants.
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But are they really objects?
A critic might complain that just because a singular term has been shown to refer in the Facts
First sense of reference, there is no reason to think that it really refers. Such a complaint
would beg the question in the present context. According to the Facts First View, what it is
for a singular term of one’s language to really refer is for it to figure in an atomic sentence
that expresses a true proposition.
Return to an earlier analogy. I take the notion of metaphysical fashionability to be
irreparably misguided, so I think that only the community-relative notion of fashionability
deserves a place in our cognitive lives: to be fashionable just is to be fashionable in the
community-relative sense. Similarly the Facts First View takes an absolutist conception
of objecthood to be irreparably misguided. So only the language-relative conception of
objecthood deserves a place in our cognitive lives: to be an object just is to be an object in
the language-relative sense.
There is a second line of attack against the Facts First View that should also be resisted,
but for a different reason. It starts by construing the Facts First conception of objecthood as
the claim that to be an object is to be the referent of a singular term of some possible language.
It then uses this claim to argue that proponents of the Facts First View don’t really manage
to avoid commitment to an “absolutely general” domain of discourse. For the absolutely
general domain is simply the result of taking the space of all possible languages and pooling
together the referents of all their singular terms.
I’m not sure this argument succeeds on its own terms, because I’m not sure that there is a
definite fact of the matter about what counts as a “possible language”.18 Either way, it seems
to me that the argument misses its target by mischaracterizing the Facts First View. A pro-
ponent of the Facts First View does not claim that to be an object (in a language-transcendent
sense) is to be the referent of a singular term of some possible language. She claims instead
that there is no sense to be made of a language-transcendent notion of objecthood. She might
18See Eklund 2014 for a related point, and Rayo 2014 for an effort to respond to it.
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add that (within a given language) there isn’t much to be said about what being an object
consists in. What there is to be said is what one says when one uses the language in question
to assert “everything is an object”, or some analogue sentence.
Actually, one can say a little bit more by engaging in semantic ascent; namely: that all
there is to using one’s language to correctly describe the world as containing objects is to
correctly describe the facts that make up the world using sentences of one’s language that
include singular terms (or variables taking singular term positions).
5 Further Discussion
Why accept a facts-first conception of the world?
I would like to suggest that the Facts First View does a better job of explaining our linguistic
practice than its Objects First counterpart.
Consider, in particular, the ease with which we feel free to expand our domain discourse
when it suits our communicative purposes. We do not hesitate to go from an event-free state-
ment like “they started arguing” to an event-loaded counterpart, like “an argument broke
out”. We routinely expand our domain of discourse to keep track of our social practices: we
talk about commitments, and bank accounts, and universities, and votes, and cabinet posi-
tions. We routinely expand our domain of discourse to streamline our descriptions of the
natural world—as when we talk about orbits or tides—or to abstract away from irrelevant
differences between objects—as when we talk about particle-types or letter-types. And we
do not hesitate to introduce talk of mathematical objects when it is expedient to do so.
On the Objects First View, this leaves us with an awkward choice. We must choose
between the claim that much of ordinary discourse is to be understood non-literally, and the
claim that much of our ordinary discourse might turn out to be false for reasons that speakers
would fail to recognize as germane to their purposes, since we might end up speaking falsely
when we talk about Socrates’s death, or my bank account, or the moon’s orbit, or Newton’s
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Principia, or Hilbert spaces.
On the Facts First View, in contrast, there is nothing objectionable about expanding
one’s domain of discourse to suit one’s communicative aims. The expansion is risk-free
because our singular terms are guaranteed to refer, as long the facts that make up the world
are accurately described by our sentences.19
Complementarity
As we have seen, the Representation Theorems entail that the assignments of propositions
to sentences that can be generated by a domain-based semantics (given a suitable domain)
are exactly the assignments that can be generated by a domain-free semantics (with no need
to presuppose a domain). But domain-based and domain-free semantics are more than just
convergent. There is an important sense in which they are complementary to one another:
they each suffer from a limitation that can be overcome by appeal to its counterpart.
Domain-free semantics are not well-suited to figure in an account of linguistic compe-
tence because they are only compositional in a limited sense: they are compositional in their
treatment of complex sentences, but not in their treatment of atomic sentences. This limited
compositionality makes a domain-free semantics implausible as a piece of human psychol-
ogy: whatever our linguistic competence consists in, it does not consist in a grasp of I and ι
and an understanding of how they might be used to derive J. . .Kι. So a domain free-semantics
cannot stand on its own. It needs a domain-based counterpart to account for linguistic com-
petence. Happily, the Representation Theorem guarantees that a suitable counterpart will
always be available.
It is worth noting, however, that domain-based semantics have limitations of their own.
Let me illustrate the point with an example. Suppose that the arithmetical language LN of
Section 4 is used by a community of speakers as part of a linguistic practice. Suppose, more-
19Related views have been recently defended by Sidelle (2002), Chalmers (2009), Eklund (2009), Hirsch
(2010) and Thomasson (2015).
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over, that we—the theorists—favor a metasemantics that assigns propositions to sentences
before assigning referents to subsententential expressions (Lewis 1973). Suppose, finally, that
when we apply our metasemantics to the relevant linguistic practice we get the following
assignment of propositions to sentences:
• every mathematical truth in LN is assigned the necessary proposition;
• every mathematical falsehood in LN is assigned the impossible proposition.
Since human speakers have finite cognitive capabilities, we should expect this assignment to
be generable compositionally, from an assignment of semantic values to basic lexical items.
And, of course, it is not hard to find a domain-based semantics that does the job: one takes
one’s domain of discourse to consist of the natural numbers, and assigns interpretations to
the non-logical vocabulary of LN in the usual way.
Notice, however, that our domain-based semantics for LN relies on an ontological as-
sumption: it presupposes that the natural numbers exist.20 A friend of the Objects First
View will think that this ontological assumption opens the door to a certain kind of chal-
lenge: unless we are justified in thinking that the “absolutely general” domain includes natu-
ral numbers, we won’t be justified in using a semantics based on a domain of natural numbers
to show that our assignment of propositions to sentences counts as an adequate interpreta-
tion of LN.
On the Facts First View, the worry can be defused. By the Converse Representation
Theorem, the possibility of giving a domain-based semantics for LN (given a domain of
natural numbers) entails that it it is also possible to give a domain-free semantics for LN
(with no need for such a domain). And by the Facts First version of the Adequacy Thesis,
this is enough to guarantee that our assignment of propositions to sentences of LN is in good
20In fact, one needs the stronger assumption that the natural numbers exist necessarily. In order to vindicate
this assumption on the basis of the bootstrapping procedure described below, we need to use a slight strength-
ening of the Facts First version of the Reference Thesis. When an assignment of propositions to sentences
maps an atomic sentence pP (c)q to a true proposition, we need not just the claim that c refers, but also the
claim that c refers at every world at which the proposition is true.
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standing. Notice, moreover, that this puts a friend of the Facts First View in a position to
run a bootstrapping argument. She can use the Facts First version of the Reference Thesis
to go from the observation that the sentences “0 = 0”, “1 = 1”, . . . of LN all express true
propositions to the conclusion that the numerals “0”, “1”, . . . are all referential, and therefore
to the conclusion that the natural numbers exist. So she is in a position to justify the very
ontological assumption that is needed to get our domain-based semantics to work.
And, of course, the point generalizes. The bootstrapping argument will always be avail-
able to proponents of the Facts First View as a way of using a domain-free semantics to
justify the ontological assumptions of its domain-based counterpart.21 This is in keeping
with the spirit of the Facts First View, on which expanding our domain of discourse is risk
free: our singular terms are guaranteed to refer, as long the facts that make up the world are
accurately described by our sentences.
6 Conclusion
I have tried to articulate an anti-absolutist picture of the world. It is based on the Facts
First View, which is a conception of the relationship between our language and the world it
represents. According to the Facts First View, all there is to correctly describing the world as
containing objects is to correctly describe the facts that make up the world using sentences
that include singular terms (or variables taking singular term positions). Although claims
of this kind have been defended by many different philosophers over the years, I hope to
have added precision to the underlying picture by articulating it on the basis of the formal
framework that emerges from a domain-free account of quantification.22
21If this is right, there is no need to worry about Chomsky’s notorious London argument (Chomsky 2000,
37), as interpreted by Stoljar (2014).
22For their many helpful comments, I am grateful to Andrew Bacon, Cian Dorr, Adam Elga, Salvatore
Florio, Peter Fritz, Jeremy Goodman, Bob Hale, Benj Hellie, Kathrin Koslicki, David Liebesman, Rose Lene-
han, Øystein Linnebo, Matthew Mandelkern, Gideon Rosen, Jeff Russell, Graham Priest, Brad Skow, Raul
Saucedo, Jonathan Schaffer, Ted Sider, Jack Spencer, Judy Thomson, Robert Truman, Jason Turner, and to
audiences at MIT, Oxford University, SOFIA, the University of Arizona, the University of California, Irvine,
the University of Pavia, and the University of Oslo. Special thanks are due to Matthias Jenny, who I was lucky
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to spell out the details of the domain-free semantics I describe
in Section 3.
Definitions
We work with a first-order language L whose individual constants are a0, a1, a2, . . .. (To
keep things simple, I shall assume that L contains no function-letters.) We will work with
the following definitions:
• An atomic assignment is a function that assigns a proposition to each atomic sentence
of L.
• An interpretation of the predicates and individual constants of L is a triple 〈I, ι, ◦〉,
where I is a non-empty set of atomic assignments, ι is a distinguished member of
I , and ◦ is a function that takes each pair of atomic assignments in I to an atomic
assignment in I .
(I is to be thought of as the set of atomic assignments that are compatible with the
intended interpretation of the predicates of L. ι is to be thought of as the unique
atomic assignment in I which is not only compatible with the intended interpretation
of the predicates of L, but is also compatible with the intended interpretation of the
individual constants of L.)
• I assume that every atomic assignment in I respects the logical properties of the iden-
tity predicate “=”.
This is to be spelled out as follows. Let > and ⊥ be the top and bottom elements of
one’s algebra, respectively, let “∧”, “∨” and “¬” express the algebra’s meet, join and
enough to have as a research assistant on this project. Matthias performed a careful review of the manuscript
and proofs, and added much needed bibliographical references.
24
not operations, respectively, and let pp ≤ qq express the thought that proposition p
algebraically entails proposition q. Let a, b and c be arbitrary individual constants of
L, Sa be an atomic sentence of L in which a occurs and Sb be the result of replacing
some occurrences of a in Sa by b. Then we require each i ∈ I to satisfy the following
constraints:
1. Negative free logic
i(Sa) ≤ i(pa = aq);
2. Necessity of identity and distinctness
either i(pa = bq) = i(pa = aq) or i(pa = bq) = ⊥;
3. Transitivity
(i(pa = bq) ∧ i(pb = cq)) ≤ i(pa = cq);
4. Intersubstitutivity
i(pa = bq) ≤ i(Sa)↔ i(Sb)
(where pp↔ qq is a syntactic abbreviation for p(p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q)q).
Note that condition 4 entails symmetry: i(pa = bq) = i(pb = aq). Note also that if
one wanted to work with classical logic, rather than negative free logic, it suffices to
strengthen condition 1 to “i(pa = aq) = >”.
• ◦ is a “fusion” function defined on members of I .
The intuitive idea is that i ◦ j is an atomic assignment that “combines” i and j’s in-
terpretations of the individual constants, by interpreting the constant a2n the way i
interprets constant an and interpreting a2n+1 they way j interprets constant an.
We implement this idea formally by introducing the individual constant relabelling
operations “←−” and “−→”:
←−ak = a2k −→ak = a2k+1
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and requiring ◦ to satisfy the following condition:
i ◦ j(pP (←−ak0 , . . . ,←−akn)q) = i(pP (ak0 , . . . , akn)q)
i ◦ j(pP (−→ak0 , . . . ,−→akn)q) = j(pP (ak0 , . . . , akn)q)
We also need to make sure that the fusion of an atomic assignment with itself does no
more than relabel individual constants. We implement this idea formally by requiring
a generalized version of the following:23
i ◦ i(p←−ak = −→akq) = i(pak = akq)
Finally, we need to make sure that the order in which atomic assignments are brought
together by the fusion operator doesn’t matter. We do this by requiring ◦ to satisfy a
generalized version of the following symmetry condition:24
i ◦ j(pP (←−ak ,−→al )q) = j ◦ i(pP (−→ak ,←−al )q)
An interpretation of L is a function that assigns a proposition to every sentence of L. I
will now explain how to extend an interpretation 〈I, ι, ◦〉 of the predicates and individual
constants of L to an interpretation of the entire langauge.
For i ∈ I , we let J. . .Ki be defined as follows:
• if A is an atomic sentence, then JAKi = i(A);
• Jp¬AqKi is the algebraic complement of JAKi;
23The generalization is as follows:
i ◦ j1 ◦ . . . ◦ jn ◦ i(p←
n+1
ak = −→akq) = i(pak = akq)
Here and throughout, i ◦ j ◦ h = (i ◦ j) ◦ h, and←n and→n are the nth iterations of← and→, respectively.
24The generalization is as follows, for r < 0:
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• JpA ∨BqKi is the least upper bound of JAKi and JBKi;
• Jp∃x φ(ak0 , . . . , akn , x)qKi is the least upper bound of the set of propositionsJp−→am = −→amqKi◦j ∩ Jpφ(←−ak0 , . . . ,←−akn ,−→am)qKi◦j for m ∈ N and j ∈ I .
The intended interpretation of L is J. . .Kι, which will sometimes be referred to as “J. . .K”
(with no subscript).
Proofs
Let 〈I, ι, ◦〉 be an interpretation of the predicates and individual constants of L. For i, j ∈ I
we shall say that j is reachable from i if, for some n ∈ N, there exist j1, . . . , jn ∈ I such that
j = i ◦ j1 ◦ . . . jn.
Let I i be the set of j ∈ I such that j is reachable from i, and let L+ be the result
of enriching L with a new constant cjn for each j ∈ I i and n ∈ N. We will extend the
interpretation J. . .Ki of L to an interpretation J. . .K+i of L+, as follows:
• LetA be an atomic sentence with individual constants al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn .25 Then:
JAK+i = JA∗Ki◦j1◦...◦jn
where A∗ is the result of substituting ←
n
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• Jp¬AqK+i is the algebraic complement of JAK+i ;
• JpA ∨BqK+i is the least upper bound of JAK+i and JBK+i ;
• Jp∃x φ(x)qK+i is the least upper bound of the set of propositionsJpcrt = crtqK+i ∩ Jpφ(crt )qK+i , for t ∈ N and r ∈ I i.
25I assume first occurrence of cjqkq in A occurs before the first occurrence of c
jr
kr
in A, for q < r).
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Proposition 1 For any sentence pφ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , c
jn
kn
)q of L+ and any i ∈ I ,
Jpφ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn)qK+i = Jpφ(←nal1 , . . . ,←nalm ,←n−1→ak1 ,←n−2→ak2 , . . . , ←1→akn−1 , →akn)qKi◦j1◦...◦jn
Proof We proceed by induction on the complexity of sentences. The only non-trivial case
is
pφ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , c
jn
kn
)q = p∃x ψ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn , x)q
So we need to verify that the least upper bound of
Jpcrt = crtqK+i ∩ Jpψ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn , crt )qK+i
(for t ∈ N and r ∈ I i) equals the least upper bound of
Jp−→am = −→amqKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦j ∩ Jpψ(←n+1al1 , . . . ,←n+1alm ,←n→ak1 ,←n−1→ak2 , . . . , ←2→akn−1 ,←1→akn ,→am)qKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦j
(for m ∈ N and j ∈ I). The result follows from the following two observations:
• Fix r ∈ I i and t ∈ N. Then it follows from the definition of J. . .K+i that Jpcrt = crtqK+i
equals Jp−→at = −→atqKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦j , and it follows from our inductive hypothesis thatJpψ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn , crt )qK+i equals
Jpψ(←n+1al1 , . . . ,←n+1alm ,←n→ak1 ,←n−1→ak2 , . . . , ←2→akn−1 ,←1→akn ,→at )qKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦r
• Fixm ∈ N and j ∈ I . Then it follows from the definition of J. . .K+i that Jp−→am = −→amqKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦j
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equals, Jpcjm = cjmqK+i , and it follows from our inductive hypothesis that
Jpψ(←n+1al1 , . . . ,←n+1alm ,←n→ak1 ,←n−1→ak2 , . . . , ←2→akn−1 ,←1→akn ,→am)qKi◦j1◦...◦jn◦j
equals Jpψ(al1 , . . . , alm , cj1k1 , . . . , cjnkn , cjm)qK+i .
Corollary 1 For any sentence A of L, JAK = JAK+.
Proof Our corollary is the special case of Proposition 1 in which i = ι and n = 0.
It is a consequence of the Stone Representation Theorem that no generality is lost if
we assume that the propositions in our algebra are sets of “worlds” w ∈ W , and that the
meet, join and not operations of our algebra are set-theoretic intersection, union and com-
plementation, respectively. When our algebra of propositions is thought of in this way, we
can define the notion of truth-at-a-world: a sentence φ of L+ is true at world w just in case
w ∈ JφK+.
Proposition 2 For each world w ∈ W , the sentences true at w form a maximally consistent set
with witnesses (i.e. a maximally consistent set in which every existential sentence true at w has an
instance which is true at w).
Proof All we need to do is check that p∃x φ(x)q is true at w if and only if pd = dq and
pφ(d)q are both true at w, for some individual constant d of L+.
The left to right direction follows immediately from the definition of J. . .K+ι . For the
right to left direction, there are two cases: d = ak (k ∈ N) and d = crt (t ∈ N, r ∈ I ι).
If d = crt , the result follows immediately from the definition of J. . .K+ι . So it is enough
for present purposes to assume that d = ak and show that Jpφ(ak)qK+ι = Jpφ(cιk)qK+ι .
The proof is by induction on the complexity of sentences, but the only interesting case
is when pφ(ak)q is an atomic sentence. With no real loss of generality, we let pφ(ak)q =
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Accordingly, we wish to show that JpP 0(ak)qK+ι = JpP 0(cιk)qK+ι . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: verify JpP 0(ak)qK+ι = JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι. Step 2: verify JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι =JpP 0(cιk)qK+ι .
Step 1. The Intersubstitutivity condition on atomic assignments guarantees that:
Jp←n+1ak = −→akqKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι ⊆ JpP n+1(←n+1ak )↔ P n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι
By the generalized version of the just-relabelling constraint on “◦”, we have Jak = akKι =Jp←n+1ak = −→akqKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι. So we can simplify the above to:
Jak = akKι ⊆ JpP n+1(←n+1ak )↔ P n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι (1)
The Negative Free Logic condition an atomic assignments gives us
JpP n+1(←n+1ak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι ⊆ Jp←n+1ak =←n+1ak qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι. Since it follows from our char-
acterization of ◦ that Jp←n+1ak =←n+1ak qKι◦j1◦...◦jnι = Jak = akKι, this means that we can use
equation (1) to show:
JpP n+1(←n+1ak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι ⊆ JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι (2)
The Negative Free Logic condition also gives us JP n+1(→ak)Kι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι ⊆ J→ak=→akKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι.
Since it follows from our characterization of ◦ that J→ak=→akKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι = Jak = akKι, this
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means that we can use equation (1) to show:
JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι ⊆ JpP n+1(←n+1ak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι (3)
Combining (2) and (3) gives us
JpP n+1(←n+1ak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι = JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι (4)
This is enough to give us what we want, since the definition of J. . .K+ guarrantees that
JpP 0(ak)qK+ι = JpP n(←nak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn and the constraints on ◦ guarantee that
JpP n(←nak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn = JpP n+1(←n+1ak )qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι.
Step 2. The definition of J. . .K+i entails:
JpP 0(cιk)qK+ι = JpP (←n+1al1 , . . . ,←n+1alm ,←n→ak ,←n−1→ak1 , . . . , ←→akn−1 , →akn)qKι◦ι◦j1◦...◦jn
But the generalized symmetry condition on ◦ entails that the right-hand term of this equa-
tion denotes the same proposition as
JpP (←n+1al1 , . . . ,←n+1alm ,→ak ,←n→ak1 ,←n−1→ak2 , . . . , ←→akn)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι
which is just JpP n+1(→ak)qKι◦j1◦...◦jn◦ι.
Proposition 3 For w ∈ W , consider the set Cw of constants dk of L+ such that pdk = dkq
is true at w. Then “=” is an equivalence relation over Cw, in the following sense. For any
dk, dl, dm ∈ Cw:
(a) pdk = dkq is true at w;
(b) if pdk = dlq is true at w, then pdl = dkq is true at w,
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(c) if pdk = dlq and pdl = dmq are both true at w; then pdl = dmq is true at w.
Proof Condition (a) is trivial.
To verify condition (b), we assume that dk = cik and dl = c
j
l , and show Jpcik = cjl qK+ =Jpcjl = cikqK+. (The case where one or both of the constants di and dk is of the form am is
analogous.) By the definition of J. . .K+i , Jpcik = cjl qK+ = Jp←→ak=→al qKι◦i◦j and Jpcjl = cikqK+ =Jp←→al=→akqKι◦j◦i. But by the symmetry condition on ◦ and the fact that atomic assignments
satisfy the logical properties of “=”, Jp←→ak=→al qKι◦i◦j = Jp←→al=→akqKι◦j◦i.
To verify condition (c), we shall assume that dk = cik, dl = c
j
l and dm = chm. (The
case where some or all of the constants di, dk and dm is of the form am is analogous.) We
proceed by supposing that w ∈ Jpcik = cjl qK+ and w ∈ Jpcjl = chmqK+, and proving that
w ∈ Jpcik = chmqK+.
From the fact that atomic assignments satisfy the logical properties of “=”, we know:
Jp←2→ak =←→al ∧ →am=→amqKι◦i◦j◦h ∩ Jp←→al=→am ∧ ←2→ak =←2→ak qKι◦i◦j◦h ⊆ Jp←2→ak =→am ∧ ←→al=←→al qKι◦i◦j◦h
But by Proposition 1 and the symmetry condition on ◦ we have:
• Jpcik = cjl ∧ chm = chmqK+ = Jp←2→ak =←→al ∧ →am=→amqKι◦i◦j◦h
• Jpcjl = chm ∧ cik = cikqK+ = Jp←2→al =←→am ∧ →ak=→akqKι◦j◦h◦i = Jp←→al=→am ∧ ←2→ak =←2→ak qKι◦i◦j◦h
• Jpcik = chm ∧ cjl = cjl qK+ = Jp←2→ak =←→am ∧ →al=→al qKι◦i◦h◦j = Jp←2→ak =→am ∧ ←→al=←→al qKι◦i◦j◦h
So we know:
Jpcik = cjl ∧ chm = chmqK+ ∩ Jpcjl = chm ∧ cik = cikqK+ ⊆ Jpcik = chm ∧ cjl = cjl qK+
Since we are supposing w ∈ Jpcik = cjl qK+ and w ∈ Jpcjl = chmqK+, the definition of J. . .K+i ,
together with the fact that atomic assignments satisfy the logical properties of “=”, gives us:
32
• w ∈ Jpcik = cjl qK+ ↔ w ∈ Jpcik = cjl ∧ chm = chmqK+
• w ∈ Jpcjl = chmqK+ ↔ w ∈ Jpcjl = chm ∧ cik = cikqK+
• w ∈ Jpcik = chmqK+ ↔ w ∈ Jpcik = chm ∧ cjl = cjl qK+
So we have
w ∈ Jpcik = cjl qK+ ∩ Jpcjl = chmqK+ → w ∈ Jpcik = chmqK+
Our supposition therefore guarantees that w ∈ Jpcik = chmqK+.
A Kripke Structure for a first-order language is a tuple 〈W,a,D, d, c, p〉, whereW is a set of
worlds, a ∈ W is the “actualized” world, D is a domain of objects, d is a function that assigns
a subset Dw of D to each w ∈ W , c is a (possibly partial) function that assigns objects in D
to individual constants, p is a function that assigns to each pair 〈w,P 〉 (w ∈ W , P an n-place
predicate of the language) a set of n-tuples of Dw, where p(〈w, “=”〉) = {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ Dw}.
Truth at a world is defined compositionally, in the usual way. For a Kripke structure to verify
an assignment of propositions to sentences is for the proposition assigned to each sentence
to consist of the set of worlds at which that sentence is true.
Proposition 4 There is a Kripke structure that verifies the intended interpretation J. . .K+ of L+.
Proof Let w ∈ W . We know from Proposition 3 that “=” is an equivalence relation over
Cw. For eachw ∈ W , we let the domainDw ofw be the set of equivalence classes of constants
inCw, and we letD be the union of theDw. Since, by Proposition 2, the sentences of L+ that
are true at w form a maximally consistent set with witnesses, we can use the construction
familiar from standard presentations of the completeness theorem for first-order languages
to construct a model with domain Dw which verifies every sentence of L+ which is true in
w.
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Corollary 2 (Representation Theorem) There is a Kripke structure that verifies the intended
interpretation J. . .K of L.
Proof The result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1.
The converse of Corollary 2 is also true:
Proposition 5 (Converse Representation Theorem) For any Kripke Structure 〈W,a,D, d, c, p〉
for a first-order language L, there is a set of atomic assignments I for L, an assignment ι ∈ I and
a fusion operator ◦ on the elements of I such that J. . .Kι is verified by 〈W,a,D, d, c, p〉.
Proof If c′ is a (possibly partial) function which assigns objects in D to individual constants
of L, we shall say that atomic assignment i is generated from c′ just in case, for each atomic
sentence A, i(A) is the set of worlds w such that A is true at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, c′, p〉.
We let I consist of the atomic assignments i which are generated by some c′, and let ι be the
special case in which c′ = c.
For each i ∈ I , choose a function ci such that i is generated from ci. The fusion operator
“◦” is then defined in the natural way: i ◦ j(A) is the set of worlds w such that A is true
at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, c∗, p〉, where c∗(←ak) = ci(ak) and c∗(→ak) = cj(ak). It follows
immediately that i ◦ j ∈ I whenever i, j ∈ I .
We now show that, for each i ∈ I , the function J. . .Ki is verified by 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of sentences. The only interesting case is when
φ = p∃x ψ(ak1 , . . . , akn , x)q. So we need to verify that the least upper bound of propositionsJpψ(←ak1 , . . . , ←akn ,→c )qKi◦j (j ∈ I) is the set of worlds w such that p∃x ψ(aj1 , . . . , ajn , x)q is
true at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉.
Suppose first that the least upper bound of propositions Jpψ(←ak1 , . . . , ←akn ,→c )qKi◦j in-
cludes w. Then, by inductive hypothesis, pψ(←ak1 , . . . , ←akn ,→c )q is true at w according to
〈W,a,D, d, ci◦j, p〉. By the definition of ◦, this means that pψ(ak1 , . . . , akn , c)q must be sat-
isfied at w by some object in Dw according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉. So p∃x ψ(ak1 , . . . , akn , x)q
is true at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉.
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Now suppose that p∃x ψ(aj1 , . . . , ajn , x)q is true at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉.
This means that pψ(ak1 , . . . , akn , c)q is satisfied atw by some o ∈ Dw according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉.
Let cj be such that cj(c) = o, and let c∗ be such that c∗(←ak) = ci(ak) and c∗(→ak) = cj(ak).
Since pψ(ak1 , . . . , akn , c)q is satisfied atw by o according to 〈W,a,D, d, ci, p〉, pψ(←ak1 , . . . , ←akn ,→c )q
must be true at w according to 〈W,a,D, d, c∗, p〉. But by the definition of I , there must be a
j ∈ I such that j is generated from cj . And by the definition of ◦, i ◦ j is generated from c∗.
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